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Abstract 
 
When a court sets standards of due care in a tort or contract case with a view to how 
the standards will affect future behavior of parties similar to the litigants, it should 
sometimes realize that only one of the two future parties is likely to become informed 
of the standards. The standards can then only have a direct effect on the behavior of 
the informed party, and it may be thought that the court should hold the informed 
party strictly liable, which maximizes this effect. However, this ignores that the 
informed party may, although strictly liable, lower her level of care in order to induce 
the uninformed party to take greater care. In this situation, the negligence rule may do 
better than strict liability, since the discontinuity of the negligence rule can prevent 
the informed party from strategically lowering her level of care. Under the negligence 
rule, optimal standards are sensitive to whether the informed party acts first and to 
whether she is the injurer or the victim. For both the informed and the uninformed, 
there are circumstances in which the standard should be higher than first best and 
other circumstances where it should be lower. However, in the prevalent case where 
the informed party is the injurer and acts first, and the uninformed understands the 
risk, the court should under certain conditions set the standard for the informed party 
set at the first best level. The uninformed should then infer that the informed party 
has an incentive to take due care, and so take proper precautions himself. Moreover, 
the court should generally apply a lenient standard of due care to the uninformed 
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victim, as this maximizes the incentive for the informed party to take due care 
without diminishing the incentive of the uninformed party.   
JEL: K10, K13, K14 
Key words: negligence standards, one-sided legal ignorance 
 
1. Introduction   
 
When a court sets negligence standards in a tort or contract3 case and considers how 
alternative standards will affect the behavior of similarly situated parties in the future, 
it should not always assume that both future parties will become informed of the 
standards expressed by its verdict. In some situations, the court should realize that the 
standards will only become known by - and hence only affect the behavior of - one of 
the parties, usually the party that has specialized in the given activity. This raises the 
question as to whether this should cause the court to adjust its standards, e.g. by 
requiring more care from the informed party than it would if both parties could be 
relied upon to become informed of standards.  
To illustrate, consider a case in which a group of employees underwent a team-
building (survival) course organized by a professional firm4 and were told to 
undertake dangerous activities during which one of them was injured. Organizers of 
such activities are more likely to become aware of legal standards than future 
participants, since the organizers specialize in this activity, and the court should 
therefore expect to have a greater influence on the behavior of organizers than on the 
behavior of future participants. Applied to this case, the question becomes whether 
the organizer should be required to take precautions that she would not be required to 
undertake if the participant could be expected to be informed of standards of due 
care.   
The issue of optimal standards under one-sided legal ignorance is analyzed within a 
model where the court chooses a standard of due care for the injurer and a standard of 
(comparative) negligence for the victim, and where these standards determine the 
pay-offs of the subsequent liability game played between the informed party 
(henceforth IN or she) and the uninformed (henceforth U or he). The pay-off 
structure is known to IN but not to U, who may, however, attempt to infer the pay-
offs from IN’s act. Thus, U holds an ex-ante belief concerning the standards set by 
the court, and when IN acts first, U updates his belief, taking into account IN’s act of 
care. U then chooses his level of precaution based on the updated belief, whereas IN 
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chooses her level of care taking into account how U will respond. An equilibrium in 
the overall game arises when the standard chosen by the court minimizes the total 
social costs of the resulting equilibrium in the game between IN and U.  
Concerning the scope of the analysis, the analysis bears relevance not only to tort 
losses but also to losses arising as a consequence of a defective good or service 
within contract.  For services (such as e.g. advice given by lawyers, accountants, and 
banks), the negligence rule tends to apply, but for product liability the rule in many 
jurisdictions is strict liability for defective products, mainly due to the non-
verifiability of the producer’s level of care. This calls into question the relevance of 
the present analysis for product liability, as non-verifiability provides a strong 
argument for strict liability in the context of product liability, which may trump other 
considerations. However, for there to be liability, the product must not live up to the 
reasonable expectations of the buyer, and this requires the court to decide on a 
standard of reasonableness. This standard actually shares essential characteristics of 
the negligence rule: If the standard is met by the producer, she will avoid liability, 
whereas if not, the loss will be shared if the buyer has acted negligently. In this 
interpretation, the present analysis is relevant also to product liability. Moreover, 
parts of the analysis apply more generally to compensation for non-performance 
within contract law, which of course shares essential characteristics with product 
liability.5   
The main themes of the analysis concern the use of the negligence rule versus the use 
of strict liability, and whether, under the negligence rule, the standards of negligence 
for the two parties should be higher or lower than when both parties are fully 
informed. On the first theme, the negligence rule may do better than strict liability, 
since the discontinuity of the negligence rule might prevent IN from lowering her 
level of care in order to increase that of U. However, when IN cannot affect U’s act 
of care, a rule that allocates the loss to IN is optimal. On the second theme, it turns 
out that general conclusions are difficult to draw for either of the two parties. 
Surprisingly, for example, when U is the injurer and acts after IN, there are 
circumstances under which the court should apply a high standard of negligence for 
U, just as it may under certain circumstances be optimal to lower the standard for IN 
below (and in other circumstances to raise it above) the first best first level.  
Nevertheless, two conclusions can be drawn that seem relevant from a policy 
perspective: First, when U is the victim, there is no reason to hold him comparatively 
negligent as this will only diminish IN’s incentive to take due care without affecting 
U’s act of care (as U will not know about the standards). Second, in the prevalent 
case where IN is the injurer and acts first, and U understands the risk, it will be 
optimal for the court, under certain conditions, to set the standard of due care for IN 
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at the first best level. IN will then take due care due to the discontinuity of the 
negligence rule, and U will infer that IN will have taken due care, and will so take 
appropriate (first best) precautions himself.  
 
The issue analyzed in this article should be distinguished from the question of 
whether legal ignorance should serve as an excuse,6 and from the question of how 
uncertainty of the law affects optimal standards. On the issue of legal ignorance as an 
excuse, it is not the information possessed by the individual but the information that a 
similar future party is likely to have that is relevant in the present context. The issue 
is not whether being ignorant should serve as an excuse; on the contrary, the implicit 
assumption behind the present analysis may be said to be that U should not be 
required to invest in legal information, because doing so is too costly for him when 
he only takes part in the activity on a one-time or occasional basis. The issue is rather 
whether the standards themselves should be adjusted, either upwards or downwards, 
when one party is likely not to become aware of them.  
As for the distinction between ignorance and uncertainty of the law, uncertainty has 
traditionally been modeled by assuming that an uncertain individual’s beliefs can be 
represented by a probability distribution with a mean value equal to the actual 
standard. The present analysis, in contrast, assumes that U’s probability distribution 
does not change with the actual standards. As the main effect of this difference, when 
U’s beliefs are independent of the actual standards, the standards cannot (directly) 
affect U’s behavior.  
The following section relates the present article to existing literature. The third 
section introduces the model, while the fourth section analyzes which standards are 
optimal when IN acts first. In this section, two real-world cases illustrate the main 
findings. The fifth section analyzes the cases where IN dos not act first, while the 
sixth section discusses the case where U is uninformed not only of legal standards but 
also of the risk of a loss. The article concludes with remarks and a summary of the 
main findings.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
 
6 The issue of when legal ignorance should be exculpatory arises in Kaplow (1990, 
section 5). 
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2. Related literature 
 
In the law and economics literature, the implications of legal ignorance have rarely 
been modeled. Yet, two articles address the issue of optimal regulation under one-
sided legal ignorance in a context similar to the present:  
Verkerke (2004) analyzes the issue of one-sided legal ignorance in the context of 
contract law, applying the idea of penalty default rules or standards (Ayres and 
Gertner (2001)). The idea is that when only one party (IN) is aware of the legal 
default standards governing their contractual relationship, the court can induce that 
party to communicate the efficient standards to U by establishing default standards 
that are both inefficient and to U’s advantage. In order not to be bound by inefficient 
default standards, IN must then inform U of the standards that are to be applied 
instead of the default standards. According to Verkerke, this principle is not only of 
theoretical interest, but actually embedded in legal practice. While this is 
controversial (Posner (2006)), Verkerke’s analysis raises the question of whether 
penalty default rules have the potential of eliminating the problem of one-sided, legal 
ignorance within contract. However, there are reasons to be skeptical in this regard. 
Communication of standards may be rendered difficult by several factors, e.g. by 
giving rise to false impressions: If the organizer of a dangerous activity mentions to 
the participants that she will be liable only if grossly negligent, the participants might 
interpret this to mean that the activity is very dangerous or that the organizer is 
irresponsible. More generally, it will often be too complex or time consuming to 
communicate standards of due care7 in such a way that U will understand and trust 
the information, and it needs to be ex post verifiable that the communication of 
standards occurred. Thus, the issue remains how standards should be set under one-
sided legal ignorance, not only in a tort context but also when communication of 
standards between contracting parties cannot be brought about.   
Kaplow (1990) analyzes how sanctions should be set when individuals are uncertain 
about whether one or another act is subject to sanctions. While not knowing which 
act is harmful, and hence subject to sanction, the individual is assumed to know the 
size of the sanction, and the authorities can, by changing the size of the sanction, 
affect not only the individual’s incentive to undertake the act, but also his or her 
incentive to become informed of which act is harmful and hence subject to sanction. 
One insight from Kaplow’s analysis is that it may be optimal to increase the sanction 
when the individual underestimates the probability that the act is in fact harmful (and 
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subject to sanction), and to raise the sanction when a higher sanction induces socially 
optimal investment in legal information.8  
In contrast to the present analysis, Kaplow’s concerns a situation where the 
authorities control a policy instrument that has a direct influence on the individual’s 
behavior. In the present context, the size of damages can hardly be used as an 
instrument to influence the behavior of U. In tort and contract law, the sanction 
(certainly in civil law systems) is linked to the size of the loss. And even when 
damages can be either punitive or under-compensatory, U may be ignorant not only 
of the standard but also of the extent to which damages deviate from losses. Thus, the 
present analysis will assume that the authorities do not have a policy instrument by 
which they can directly affect U’s behavior.  
Finally, the connection between the doctrine of last clear chance (analyzed e.g. by 
Wittman (1981), Shavell (1983) and Miceli (2004)) and the present analysis is worth 
mentioning. The doctrine concerns the tort or contract situation where one party acts 
first and fails to take due care; the doctrine then requires the second mover to 
eliminate the risk, although doing so requires care that would not have been 
warranted if the first mover had acted with due care. The situation presents a trade-off 
between inducing the second mover to mitigate the risk, and inducing the first party 
to avoid creating the risk in the first place. The justification for the doctrine arises 
when there is some reason to expect the first mover to act without care. Thus, 
Wittman (1981) writes that “the first mover may fail to act for some reason” (p. 73), 
while Shavell (1983) adds “for some reason, such as the failure to perceive risk” (p. 
591). The present analysis points to another rationale, namely that the first mover is 
unaware of or misperceives the negligence standard. In this case, a further rationale 
can be given for the doctrine, as the doctrine will not affect the first mover’s 
incentives when the first mover is uninformed of the doctrine. To the extent that the 
second mover will be aware of the doctrine, it will provide optimal incentives.   
 
3. The model  
 
Define the following notation:  
),( xyi = : The set of standards for IN and U, respectively. y  belongs to the set Ω , 
and x  belongs to the set Ω  
 )(iy : The level of care exercised by IN as a function of the standards of due care, 
Ω∈y  
)(yx : U’s response function, i.e. U’s level of care as a function of IN’s care, Ω∈x   
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L : The size of the loss 
),( xyp : The probability of loss as a function of care by the two parties 
fbfb xy , : The first best levels of due care, i.e. the levels of care that minimize 
Lxypxy ),(++   
)(iρ : U’s prior probability of the standards i , 1)( =∑ ΩΩx iρ   
),( yiη : U’s updated probability of the standards i contingent on ,y  ∑ ΩΩ =x i 1)(η  
),,( ixyf : The share of the loss born by IN according to the comparative negligence 
rule when IN exercises care at level y , U exercises care at level ,x  and the standards 
are i . It is assumed that the parties can only share the loss; neither party can claim 
compensation for cost of precaution.9   
Note that 0=f  when IN takes due care, and that 1=f  when U takes due care and 
IN does not, whereas f is between 0 and 1 when both take less than due care.  
In the main part of the analysis ),,( xyp ),(iρ ),,( ixyf  and L are assumed to be 
common knowledge.  
Bayesian updating is defined relative to IN’s equilibrium strategy, i.e. if the set of 
standards compatible with the observed act is κ , then for any set of standards κ∈i , 
),( yiη = ∑
∈κ
ρ
ρ
j
j
i
)(
)( . Furthermore, when IN chooses a strategy that is not part of her 
equilibrium strategy, U will be allowed to form any out-of-equilibrium belief 
concerning the underlying standards, except that IN’s standard of care must be at 
least as high as the level of care chosen by IN. This restriction on the out-of-
equilibrium beliefs is natural, as there is no reason for IN to choose a higher level of 
care than required. 
A pure strategy equilibrium, ( ),),(),,(,, ***** ηyxxyyxy  must fulfill:  
1. The equilibrium beliefs, ),(* yiη , i.e. the probabilities that U attaches to the set of 
standards, i , when observing the act of care, ,y  are formed according to Bayes’ rule 
in the manner just described. 
2. For each ,y  U minimizes the sum of his cost of precaution and the part of the loss 
that he expects to bear, i.e. the response function, ),(* yx  is given by the minimization 
of ∑ −+
i
Lxypixyfyix ),()),,(1)(,(*η .   
                                           
 
9 This possibility arises in Wittman’s analysis of the last clear chance doctrine (1981). 
Within contract, costly mitigation can be compensated, but may be difficult to 
document.  
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3. For any ),( xyi = , IN’s equilibrium response to the court’s choice of standards, 
),(* xyy , minimizes IN’s cost of care plus expected liability, i.e. ),(* xyy  minimizes 
Lyxypiyxyfy ))(,()),(,( **+ . 
4. The court sets standards ),( ** xy to minimize total expected costs of the ensuing 
equilibrium, i.e. the court minimizes 
Lxyyxxyypxyyxxyy )),((),,(()),((),( ****** ++  with respect to ),( xy . 
 
4. Optimal standards of care when IN acts first  
 
4.1. IN is the injurer 
 
This case is of particular interest, since IN will often be a specialized seller of a good 
or service, while U will often be a buyer who does not take part in the activity or 
trade in the market sufficiently often to make it worthwhile for him to invest in 
information concerning standards. The following proposition establishes that the 
simple negligence rule dominates the comparative negligence rule.  
 
Proposition 1  
 
When the informed party is the injurer and acts first, it is a (weakly) dominant 
strategy for the court to apply the simple rather than the comparative negligence rule 
 
Proof: 
The main point is that if some level of care by IN can be implemented under the 
comparative negligence rule (with a standard of comparative negligence that is not 
set at its lowest possible level), then that level can also be implemented under the 
simple negligence rule. The proof proceeds by showing that if it is optimal for IN to 
take due care under the comparative negligence rule, it will also be optimal for IN to 
take due care under the simple negligence rule, and that if it is optimal for IN to take 
a lower level of care than required under the comparative negligence rule, that lower 
level can be implemented under the simple negligence rule by setting it equal to the 
standard of negligence. Since the response by U can be assumed to be unaffected, any 
outcome that can be implemented under the comparative negligence rule can thus 
also be implemented under the simple negligence rule. Thus, consider first the case 
where IN adheres to the standard under the comparative negligence rule with 
standards equal to ( xy, ): If yy =* , i.e. if IN adheres to the standard of due care, then 
for every *yy < , Lyxypyxyxyfyy ))(,())(,,,( *** +< , since *y  is better for IN than 
y . It will then also be the case that *y  is better than y  under the simple negligence 
rule, since the condition then reads: Lyxypyy ))(,(* +< , which must be fulfilled 
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when the above inequality holds, since the share, f , is below or equal to 1 by 
assumption. Second, consider the case where the equilibrium choice of care, *y , is 
less than the standard y  under the comparative negligence rule. Then for every 
*yy < : LyxypyxyxyfyLyxypyxyxyfy ))(,())(,,,())(,())(,,,( ******** +<+  given 
that *y  is preferred to y . If the standard of due care is then set equal to *y  under the 
simple negligence rule, *y  will still be preferred to any *yy < , since under the 
simple negligence rule, the condition becomes Lyxypyy ))(,( ** +< , which is 
fulfilled when the above inequality holds, since 0))(,())(,,,( ***** >Lyxypyxyxyf  
and Lyxypyxyxyf ))(,())(,,,( ** Lyxyp ))(,( *< . QED. 
 
The logic is simple: Lowering the standard for U can have only the positive effect of 
increasing IN’s incentive to adhere to the standard of due care set by the court - it 
does not decrease U’s incentive as U will not be aware of the lowering of the 
standard. Note that this logic applies generally, i.e. independently of the size of the 
sanction, of whether U understands the risk, etc.  
 
The simple negligence rule strictly dominates the comparative negligence rule when 
IN expects U to take less than due care, and when IN takes less than due care because 
she expects to share the loss with U, although IN would avoid liability altogether by 
taking due care. Thus, the proposition mainly takes on importance when IN’s 
incentive to take due care is insufficient, e.g. because uninformed victims will not 
raise claims, either because they will not become informed of the legal standard ex 
post or because a claim is not worth filing. In general, whenever there may a reason 
for strengthening IN’s incentive, it becomes relevant that IN’s incentive can be 
increased without affecting U’s incentive. 
It will now be argued that the court should set the standard of due care for IN at the 
first best level when a condition to be specified is fulfilled and U’s beliefs are rational 
in a sense to be defined. First, it will be shown that when the condition is fulfilled, 
and U believes that IN has an incentive to take due care, that belief will be self-
confirming. Second, it will be demonstrated that when U holds the self-confirming 
belief, it will be optimal for the court to set the standard for IN at the first best level. 
Recall that )(~ yx  is the level of care that U will take when he believes that IN has 
taken due care equal to y , i.e. )(~ yx  minimizes Lxypx ),(+  with respect to .x  The 
condition is that ))(~,( 2221 yxypyy +<  when 21 yy > , and concerns the importance of 
the discontinuity of the negligence rule. It simply states that it is worth it for IN to 
take due care, which rids her of all liability. The condition is likely to be fulfilled 
when losses are significant in relation to the cost of care, and when U does not 
eliminate too much of the loss when reacting to IN’s (lower) level of care.  
The following lemma can now be stated:  
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Lemma: If ))(~,( 2221 yxypyy +< when 21 yy > , U’s belief that IN has taken due care 
will be self-confirming in the sense that when U holds the belief, it will be optimal for 
IN to take due care.  
 
Proof of Lemma: When the standard of due care is 1y , the cost to IN from taking due 
care will be 1y , whereas if IN chooses some lower level of care, 2y , and U believes 
that this is the level required, IN’s cost will be ))(~,( 222 yxypy + . When the condition 
is fulfilled taking due care is then optimal for IN, which confirms U’s belief. QED. 
  
It follows that:   
 
Proposition 2 
 
When IN is the injurer and acts first and  
 
1. U understands the risk, 
2. For any 1y  and 2y where  :21 yy >  ))(~,( 2221 yxypyy +< , 
3. U holds the self-confirming belief that IN has acted with due care,  
 
 it is optimal for the court to set the standard for IN at the first best level, fby  
 
Proof: When IN takes care equal to fby , U will expect IN to have taken due care and 
will therefore take care at that level which minimizes Lxypx fb ),(+  with respect to 
.x  This is the first best level of care, fbx . Hence, the court can implement the first 
best outcome by setting the standard at the first best level. QED. 
 
The question arises whether it remains optimal to set the first best standard for IN 
when U may form other out-of-equilibrium beliefs. It turns out that the answer is 
affirmative, although with a qualification. Thus, when the following two conditions 
hold, the first best outcome is the only possible equilibrium when the court sets the 
standard for IN at fby .  
Condition 1: Lyxypyy fb ))(~,(+<  for .fbyy <  
Condition 2: When U believes that IN has acted with less than due care, U will take 
no more care than if he believes that IN has taken due care, since U will expect to 
share the loss with IN.  
This second condition is not always fulfilled. The possibility exists that IN may take 
very little care in order to make U believe that the standard of comparative 
negligence is very high, which might induce U to conform to the very high standard 
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in order to shift the whole loss to IN. However, a plausible (sufficient, not necessary) 
condition can be put on U’s out-of-equilibrium beliefs, under which Condition 2 is 
fulfilled:  
Condition 2’: When U believes that the standard of due care for IN is higher than 
some level 'y , then U also believes that the standard for himself cannot be higher 
than )(~ 'yx , where )(~ 'yx minimizes Lxypx ),( '+  with respect to .x   
The proof that these conditions are sufficient can be found in Appendix A.  
Note that the conditions are sufficient but not necessary. For example, when IN’s 
choice of care is dichotomous, it will never be optimal for the court to set a different 
standard for IN than the first best, as can be seen by simply noting that if the first best 
is the lower of the two possible care levels, it can be realized by only requiring low 
care by IN, and if first best is the higher of the two, it will never be strictly better to 
only require a low level of care (since this will of course not implement high care by 
IN). 
It remains to be analyzed how standards should be set when Condition 1 above is not 
fulfilled. It is then challenging for the court to set the standard for IN, as there are 
circumstances in which the court should lower the standard for IN compared to the 
first best standard as well as other circumstances in which the court should raise the 
standard compared to the first best standard. The circumstances differ in terms of U’s 
beliefs which are likely to be unknown to the court.    
 
Proposition 3  
 
When the informed party is the injurer and acts first, when the uninformed party 
knows the size of the risk, and when Condition 1 above is not fulfilled, it can be 
optimal for the court to set a lower or - under different circumstances - a higher 
standard than the first best for the informed party  
 
Proof: See Appendix B 
 
The logic can be explained as follows. On the one hand, it can be optimal for the 
court to set a lower than first best standard of due care when U expects the standard 
for IN to be lower than first best. The point is that if the court sets the standard at first 
best, IN might take advantage of U’s belief and exercise the lower level of care that U 
expects, whereas if the court sets the standard at a lower level, namely in between the 
first best standard and what U expects, IN might wish to adhere to the standard set by 
the court rather than take the lower level of care that U expects. On the other hand, it 
can be optimal to set a higher standard than the first best when U expects the standard 
to be higher than first best, for if the standard is then set equal to the first best, U 
might respond with too little care, believing that IN will be liable. If the standard is 
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then raised, IN might still adhere to the higher standard, and U will then take 
adequate precautions, because U will no longer think that IN will be liable. 
  
Proposition 3 implies that when U is aware of the risk, there is no clear presumption 
that the court should raise the standard for IN when U is legally ignorant, as one 
might perhaps be inclined to assume. The proposition illustrates that setting standards 
properly can be complex when U draws inferences based on how IN acts, and IN is 
aware of this.  
Finally, it may be added that when the situation mentioned above arises where few 
claims are raised by the uninformed victims, it can become suboptimal for IN to take 
due care at the first best level, and it can then be shown to be potentially optimal for 
the court to lower the standard for IN, so as to make it worthwhile for IN to take due 
care.  
Two real-world cases will now illustrate a tension between Proposition 1 and 2. 
While the first proposition directs attention away from how U acts and towards what 
IN could have done to prevent an accident, the other proposition provides a reason 
not to increase the standard for IN beyond the first best level.  
 
4.2. Two real world cases  
 
In a case10 decided by the Danish Supreme Court, a group of defrauded amateur 
investors sued a bank for not having told them that it had not inspected a financial 
project on which the investors based their loan from the bank.11 The project turned 
out to be fraudulent, and while the bank was not involved in the fraud, the bank’s 
name was mentioned in the project in such a way that the investors could perhaps 
have inferred, as they claimed to have done, that the bank had lent its reputation to 
the project. In its verdict, the Supreme Court sent two signals: One to amateur 
investors that they must seek professional advice, and one to banks that they should 
inform their customers of their lack of involvement. (Ultimately, however, the Court 
did not hold the bank liable).   
Applied to this case, the first proposition stresses that it may be futile from an 
incentive viewpoint to require amateur investors to seek professional advice or to 
                                           
 
10 Court case U.2000.577/2H 
11 Note that this is a duty to warn case; the issue is the extent to which I should be 
required to warn U, and how much vigilance should be required of U. Naturally, the 
duty to warn literature has already studied the issue of one-sided ignorance 
concerning the risk, but the issue here is that of one-sided ignorance concerning the 
duty for the seller (typically) to inform the buyer and the duty for the buyer to 
become informed.  
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take some other precaution. To the extent that future amateur investors will not know 
the standards, these will not affect their behavior. The first proposition thus directs 
attention to the standard applied to IN. The second proposition poses the question of 
whether U can be relied on to take proper precautions given the act of care by IN. 
However, to suppose that amateur investors will take proper precautions seems 
dubious, reflecting the more restrictive assumptions underlying the second 
proposition. The proposition relies on the investors believing that when the bank does 
not warn them, it must be because the bank is not required to do so, for otherwise the 
bank would have had an incentive to do it. If investors think in these terms, they will 
be on guard when the bank does not warn them, but investors might of course also be 
led to believe (with some probability) that the bank does not warn them, because it 
has checked the project and found nothing wrong. Hence, the assumption that the 
investors are aware of the existence of a risk or perceive it correctly may not hold. In 
essence, investors might not be guided by a standard requiring them to seek 
professional advice; some of them might therefore make mistakes and it can therefore 
be correct for the court to require the bank to warn customers although this is not the 
first best allocation of obligations. Hence, the first proposition arguably has greater 
relevance than the second in the context of this case, reflecting that it does not rely on 
U being aware of the risk.   
As the second example, consider the case of the survival course mentioned in the 
introduction. In this case, the first proposition again appears to be relevant, as 
standards seem unlikely to become known by future participants. This raises the 
question as to the relevance of the second proposition. Arguably, most participants 
may indeed take proper precautions, realizing the danger of personal injury. 
Moreover, it may enter their minds that the organizer has an incentive to follow legal 
standards, and that they therefore bear the risk themselves. In other words, 
Proposition 2 is not without relevance in this case, and the standard for IN should 
possibly be set at the first best level (realistically taking into account, of course, that 
participants may make errors of judgment, etc.).12  
 
4.3. IN is the victim  
   
IN may well be the victim. For example, an insurance company may suffer losses 
when an insurance client fills in a questionnaire inaccurately; an employer may suffer 
                                           
 
12 The abstract standard tort model (in which no tort case ever arises in equilibrium) 
should not be taken too literally; both injurers and victims make mistakes and this 
should generally be born in mind when one sets standards; it can e.g. be optimal to 
require more care by one party when the other party is likely to make occasional 
mistakes.   
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losses caused by an employee; or a landlord may suffer losses due to a tenant. This 
case will now be shown to differ markedly from the case where IN is the injurer.  
The equilibrium conditions for the case where IN is the potential victim and acts 
before U are analogous to those stated above for the case where IN is the injurer, 
except that the sharing rule distinguishes between the injurer and the victim. As the 
first result, it is (weakly) dominant for the court to apply the contributory rather than 
the comparative negligence rule.  
 
Proposition 4  
 
When IN acts first as the (potential) victim, it is a weakly dominant strategy for the 
court to apply the contributory negligence rule 
 
Proof: See Appendix C 
  
The point is that the contributory and comparative negligence lead to the same 
sharing of the loss when U acts with due care as well as when IN acts with due care 
while U does not. A difference arises only when both IN and U act with less than due 
care. In the latter case, the contributory negligence rule provides sharper incentives 
for IN to take due care, since she bears the whole loss when she acts with 
contributory negligence. Thus, the contributory negligence rule creates a similar 
discontinuity for the victim as the negligence rule does for the injurer, and this 
discontinuity increases the ability for the court to control IN’s behavior when IN is 
the victim.  
Note that it will only be strictly dominant to apply the contributory negligence rule, 
when IN is tempted to take less than due care, and U’s response will be to also take 
less than due care. Thus, for the rule to be strictly dominant, it must be the case that 
IN’s incentive to take due care under the comparative negligence rule is not 
sufficient, although by taking care, she will avoid sharing the loss with U. This is 
similar to the result above, that it is weakly optimal to apply the simple negligence 
rule when IN is the injurer.  
An important difference to the case where IN is the injurer arises from the fact that 
when U believes that IN will take due care, U will not necessarily have an incentive 
to minimize Lxypx ),(+  with respect to x , as he does when he is the victim and 
expects IN not to be liable. If U believes that the standard of due care for him is at a 
given level, he will tend to take that level of care in order to avoid liability. Thus, U’s 
beliefs about standards come to play a greater role. This implies that it will generally 
be impossible for the court to implement the first best outcome, in contrast with the 
situation where IN is the injurer. Thus, when )(~)( fbfb yxyx ≠ , first best cannot be 
implemented, since when y  is at the optimal level, )(yx will then not be. The best 
outcome which the court can hope to implement is that which minimizes 
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Lyxypyxy ))(,()( ++ , where )(yx  is U’s response function. Note that there may be 
more than one equilibrium in the game between IN and U, and so there may be more 
than one response function, depending on U’ initial beliefs. The following 
proposition holds for any such equilibrium response function, )(yx , assuming that 
when the court seeks to implement yˆ , a choice of care exists for U that is higher than 
)ˆ(yx  such that the standard can be higher than )ˆ(yx :  
 
Proposition 5 
 
When IN is the potential victim and acts first, the outcome, yˆ , which minimizes 
Lyxypyxy ))(,()( ++  can be implemented when Lyxypyy ))(,(ˆ +<  for yy ˆ<  by 
setting the standard of contributory negligence equal to yˆ , and the standard of 
negligence for U above )ˆ(yx  
 
Proof: Consider whether IN should choose yy ˆ≠ . When IN chooses yˆ , her costs are 
yˆ , since she takes due care, whereas U will be negligent given that the standard for U 
is set above )ˆ(yx .When IN chooses yy ˆ> , her cost will of course be higher than yˆ . 
When IN chooses yy ˆ< , she will be negligent, and will hence, irrespective of U’s 
negligence, bear the cost, ,))(,( Lyxypy +  due to the nature of the contributory 
negligence rule. QED 
 
The idea is to hold U negligent such that IN will have a strong incentive to adhere to 
the standard of contributory negligence in order to shift the whole loss to U. Note the 
perhaps surprising implication that U should be held liable in equilibrium; outside 
equilibrium IN should bear the whole loss whenever IN has violated the standard of 
contributory negligence. Note also, however, that the court must know not only 
relative costs and benefits of precaution, but also U’s response function which 
depends on U’s beliefs, to set optimal standards in this case.  
 
5. Optimal standards when IN does not act first 
 
5.1. IN is the injurer  
 
When IN is the injurer and acts after or at the same time as U, the act of care by U is 
determined by U’s beliefs in a Bayesian Nash-equilibrium, and is outside the 
influence of both the court and IN. The court should then concentrate on inducing IN 
to act optimally given the act of care by U. This can be done by never holding U 
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comparatively negligent, and by setting such a high standard of due care for IN that 
adhering to it is never optimal for IN, i.e. to essentially hold IN strictly liable13 
(without contributory negligence). IN will then minimize Lxypy ),(+  given ,x  
which is socially optimal. Proposition 6 follows directly:   
 
Proposition 6 
 
When IN is the injurer but does not act first, the rule of strict liability without 
contributory negligence is optimal 
 
Naturally, Proposition 6 applies also to the case where IN acts first but U does not 
observe IN’s level of care; it applies, in short, whenever IN cannot influence U’s act 
of care. 
 
When it is not possible to hold IN strictly liable, the optimal standard for IN may be 
either higher or lower than first best. For example, when U will respond with too 
much care (e.g. because he is uncertain of what is required of him (Calfee and 
Craswell (1986); Shavell (1987))), the optimal standard for IN will be lower than first 
best, when care by the two parties are substitutes rather than complements.14 
However, for reasons already established, it will generally be optimal not to hold U 
liable as doing so will only undermine IN’s incentive to take due care.  
 
5.2 IN is the victim    
 
When U acts first as the injurer, the court should, in theory, never hold U liable, as 
never holding U liable will induce the correct response from IN, which is to minimize 
the total costs given the act by U, i.e. to minimize Lxypy ),(+  given .x  This is what 
IN will do if IN does not expect U to be liable, whereas if IN expects U to be liable, 
IN might take too little care given the act of care by U. Thus, a very lenient 
negligence standard (or the absence of liability) will in principle be optimal when U 
acts first as the injurer.  
 
Proposition 7  
 
When IN is the victim and acts after U, the absence of liability for U is optimal 
                                           
 
13 Again, strict liability can be phrased as a negligence rule with a very high standard, 
which avoids the issue of whether U understands the choice of rule (rather than of 
standard).  
14 See Lando (2007).  
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Note the contrast between Propositions 6 and 7: When U is the injurer and acts 
second, U should always be held liable, whereas if U is the injurer and acts first, he 
should never be held liable.  
Naturally, Proposition 7 is mainly relevant when U takes too little care. When U 
takes too much care, as he may well do when uncertain about the standard, IN will 
know that she bears the residual risk and will hence act appropriately. It is then not 
necessary (although still optimal within the simplified model) to set a low standard 
for U.  
 
6. U is uninformed also of the risk 
 
So far, the analysis has revealed that when U’s act of care is independent of IN’s, i.e. 
when U does not act after IN, it is optimal for the court to put as much of the loss on 
IN as possible in order to induce IN to minimize total costs. This follows from 
Propositions 6 and 7. This result generalizes to cases where U does not expect there 
to be any risk of a loss (and where a duty to warn is ineffective), and where U hence 
acts without care, regardless of IN’s act of care. This, of course, is consistent with the 
prevailing rule that the seller is strictly liable for a defective product, i.e. for a loss 
that the buyer could not reasonably have expected. However, the possibility exists 
that the act of care by IN may alert U to the existence of a risk. If so, U’s response 
function will be sensitive to the act performed by IN, in which case the advantage of 
the negligence rule over strict liability in controlling IN’s act of care may come into 
play. Thus, when IN is strictly liable, she might induce too much care on the part of 
U, whereas the court can (when well-informed) set the standard for IN at the optimal 
level given U’s response function. Note, however, that when IN is the injurer and acts 
first, it may not be optimal to set the standard of due care for IN at the first best level 
when U is uninformed of the risk, for U may not be alerted to the risk when IN takes 
first best care. Thus, the court should possibly set a standard of due care for IN at a 
higher level than the first best in order to induce IN to reveal the existence of a risk to 
U. In other words, the possibility that U is uninformed of the risk, and that it may not 
be a simple solution to simply require IN to inform U of the risk, has implications 
only for the cases where IN acts first, and then in the direction of increasing the 
standard of due care required of IN either as a victim or as an injurer.  
 
7. Remarks 
 
Two remarks will be made. As the first remark, it can sometimes be clear to everyone 
involved, from conventional fairness reasoning or from the logic of cost 
minimization, what both parties ought to do to avoid an accident. Courts may wish to 
adhere to such standards, either to be fair to the litigant in the actual case, or because 
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the court hopes that the general policy of the court to require such acts to be taken can 
become known to people. Two comments will be made in this regard: First, whether 
the general policy or principle will become known to people acting outside their 
profession can be doubtful. In many if not all areas of law, most people know very 
little about how the legal system operates.15 Second, it is often not clear which 
standards sustain appropriate norms; this is often a question of judgment, of weighing 
a disparate set of costs, and, when the weighing is less obvious, both the fairness and 
the learning argument is weaker. Still, when applicable, these arguments should be 
weighed against the incentive arguments analyzed in this article; for example, they 
may strengthen the rationale for the court to maintain first best standards despite the 
presence of one-sided legal ignorance, but constrain the applicability of the finding 
that IN should bear the loss whenever U’s act of care is independent of IN’s.   
As the second remark, people may not know the nature of the negligence rule and 
will not draw the inference that IN has an incentive to act with due care to escape 
liability. However, note that when U is the victim, acts after IN, and knows the risk, 
he should take appropriate care whenever he does not expect to be able to hold IN 
liable. It seems realistic to assume that some fraction of those who are ignorant of the 
workings of the legal system will not expect to be able to sue the more professional 
counterpart, and the result that the standard for IN should be set at the first best level 
can then still hold. Moreover, the idea that the negligence rule may dominate strict 
liability when IN acts first applies whenever U’s act of care varies in some way with 
IN’s, and IN cannot be made to compensate U for a too high level of care induced by 
IN’s low level of care. For this idea to apply, it is not essential that U’s response 
function is based on a rational inference.   
 
8. Summary   
 
One way of summarizing the main findings is by contrasting them with the simple 
logic that the court should let the informed party bear the loss, since the court can 
only have an effect on the informed party’s behavior, and should hence seek to 
maximize this effect. The error in this view is that when the informed party acts first, 
she may not take the correct level of care if she realizes that she can influence the 
uninformed party’s act of care. She will then not take into account the higher cost of 
precaution that she may cause the other party to bear by lowering her own level of 
care (assuming that the informed party cannot be made liable for the uninformed 
party’s higher cost of precaution). Therefore, the negligence rule may be preferable, 
either the simple negligence rule when the informed party is the injurer, or the 
contributory negligence rule, when she is the victim. Moreover, in the former case of 
                                           
 
15 See Ellickson (1991).  
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simple negligence, the optimal standard may be the first best standard, which induces 
the first best outcome under certain not very restrictive conditions. In the latter case 
of contributory negligence, it may, contrary to the intuition that the informed party 
should bear all the risk, be optimal to always hold the uninformed party negligent in 
order to sharpen the informed party’s incentive to adhere to the standard of 
contributory negligence. However, when the informed party does not act first, and 
hence cannot influence the act of care by the uninformed party, or if for some other 
reason U’s act is independent of IN’s, the logic of allocating the loss to the informed 
party applies. The court should then apply strict liability when the injurer is the 
informed party and should never hold the uninformed liable when the injurer is the 
uninformed party. When strict liability is not an option for the court, and the court 
must set negligence standards within reasonable bounds, it may be optimal for the 
court to either increase or decrease the standard for the informed party as compared 
with the first best standard. This applies both when the informed party can affect the 
care level of the uninformed and when she cannot; there is thus no presumption, 
within the realm of the negligence rule, that the standards should be increased for the 
informed party, as long as is the uninformed party can be assumed to understand the 
risk. However, when the uninformed party is the victim, he should not be held 
comparatively negligent (or the standard should in practice be low), as letting him 
bear part of his own loss will have no effect on his act of care, but will diminish the 
incentive for the informed party to take care.  
 
Appendix A 
 
Proof that when the court sets the standard at the first best level and the following 
two conditions hold:  
 
Condition 1: Lyxypyy fb ))(~,(+<  for fbyy <  
Condition 2’: When U believes that the standard of due care for IN is higher than 
some level 'y , then U also believes that the standard for him cannot be higher than 
)(~ 'yx , where )(~ 'yx minimizes Lxypx ),( '+  with respect to x  
 
the only perfect Bayesian equilibrium is the first best outcome.   
 
The proof is by contradiction: Consider the possibility that the court sets the standard 
at ,fby  and that an equilibrium where fbyy < then arises in the game between IN and 
U. Two possibilities then emerge. Either U believes the standard is ,y  or U believes 
that the standard is higher than y  (U can safely exclude that IN has chosen a higher 
level of care than the standard). If U believes that the standard is y , i.e. that IN has 
taken due care, U will respond by )(~ yx , and the total cost to IN will then be 
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Lyxypy ))(~,(+ . This is higher than the cost of exercising first best care when 
Condition 1 is fulfilled, and so this contradicts that y  is an equilibrium choice for IN. 
If U believes the standard for IN is higher than ,y  i.e. if U expects IN to be liable, U 
will take a level of care that cannot be higher than )(~ yx , since U expects IN to bear 
part of the loss, and )(~ yx  is U’s response when U expects to bear the whole loss. U 
might wish to take a higher level of care than )(~ yx if he would thereby expect to take 
due care and put the whole loss on IN, but Condition 2 precludes that U believes the 
standard of due care for U to be higher than )(~ yx , so U will not take a higher level of 
care than )(~ yx . Given that U takes care at level )(~' yxx ≤ , then 
≥+ Lxypy ),( ' Lyxypy ))(~,(+ , in which case <fby  Lxypy ),( '+  when 
Lyxypyy fb ))(~,(+<  . Again, it is then better for IN to choose fby . This contradicts 
that there is an equilibrium where IN chooses fbyy <  when the two conditions are 
fulfilled. QED.  
 
Appendix B 
 
Proof of Proposition 3, that it may be optimal either to lower the standard or to raise 
it compared with first best when Condition 1 is not fulfilled.  
 
The following example shows that it may be optimal for the court to set a standard 
lower than first best. Thus, consider the game shown in Table 1 below, where the 
informed party chooses between three levels of care, ,0 ½,  or 1 (as parameterized by 
the cost of exercising that level of care), and the uninformed party only chooses 
between two levels of care, 0  or 1. The entries in the table are the expected losses, 
,),( Lxyp  resulting from the alternative care levels selected by the two parties.  
 
 
 
x 
y 
 
1 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0 
 
¾ 
 
½ 
 
0.6 
 
1.28 
 
0 
 
0.8 
 
3.1 
 
Table 1 
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The first best outcome is for IN to exercise level 1 and for U to exercise level 0 , the 
total cost is then 75.1 , which is the lowest attainable cost. It will now be shown that 
when 2.1
)0(
)1( <=
=
y
y
ρ
ρ  and U assumes the standard of comparative negligence is 
0=x , it is optimal for the court to set the standard ½.=y  
Proof:  Under the said conditions, the equilibrium is the following:  
;0)1(* =y  ½;(½)* =y  0)0(* =y  and  
;0)1(* ==yx  ;0½)(* ==yx  1)0(* ==yx  
=== )0,1(* yyη
)1()0(
)1(
=+=
=
yy
y
ρρ
ρ , === )0,1(* yyη −1
)1()0(
)1(
=+=
=
yy
y
ρρ
ρ , 
1½)½,(* === yyη . Out-of-equilibrium beliefs can be anything, with the said 
restriction.  
To verify that this is an equilibrium, consider U’s responses first:  
When 1=y , U must form an out-of-equilibrium belief. As mentioned above, the only 
reasonable belief is that the standard is high, i.e. ,1=y  since IN will only take care at 
level 1=y  if the standard is 1=y . If the standard is ,1=y  U will minimize his cost 
by choosing 0=x , since 14/3 < , regardless of the standard of comparative 
negligence. When ½=y , the standard must be ½=y , since, according to the 
postulated equilibrium,  this level of care is chosen only when the standard is ½=y , 
whereas IN chooses to exercise care equal to 0=y  when the standard is different 
from ½. When the standard for IN is ½,=y  U should optimally choose 0=x , again 
regardless of the standard of comparative negligence, as .6.128.1 <  When 0=y , the 
standard is either 1=y  or .0=y  If it is ,1=y  U’s cost from choosing 1=x  is 1, 
since the standard of comparative negligence cannot be higher than ,1=x  while the 
cost to U from choosing 0=x  is 0  given the assumption that U expects the standard 
of comparative negligence to be .0=x  If the standard is ,0=y  U’s costs are 8.01+  
from choosing 1=x  but 3 from choosing 0=x . The ex-post probability, )0(η , of the 
standard being ,0=y  is: 
)1()0(
)0(
=+=
=
yy
y
ρρ
ρ , while the probability is 
)1()0(
)1(
=+=
=
yy
y
ρρ
ρ  that the standard is 1=y . Hence, the expected cost for U of 
choosing 1=x  is )8.01(
)1()0(
)0(1
)1()0(
)1( +=+=
=+=+=
=
yy
y
yy
y
ρρ
ρ
ρρ
ρ , while the 
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expected cost from choosing 0=x  is 3
)1()0(
)0(0
)1()0(
)1(
=+=
=+=+=
=
yy
y
yy
y
ρρ
ρ
ρρ
ρ . 
Hence, the expected cost from choosing 1=x  is lower  when .2.1
)0(
)1( <=
=
y
y
ρ
ρ   
Next, consider IN’s incentives when U’s responds by taking high care only when IN 
chooses the lowest possible level of care. The incentives depend on the standard y  
but not on the standard ,x as will be pointed out. If the court sets a standard ,1=y  
this provides IN with an incentive to choose ,0=y  since the cost of her liability is 
then only 8.  regardless of the standard of comparative negligence. If the court sets 
the standard equal to ½,=y  IN will choose ½=y  at a cost of ½,  since if IN chooses 
,0=y  the cost to her will be 8.  regardless of the standard of comparative negligence. 
Finally, if the court sets a standard equal to ,0=y  IN will naturally choose .0=y  
Given that IN will choose 0=y  when ,1=y  while IN will choose ½=y  when 
½,=y  the optimal standard is ½=y , since the total social cost of 78.1  is lower for 
the standard ½=y  than the total cost of 8.1  for the standard 1=y  (and the social 
cost of the standard 0=y  is also ).8.1  QED.  
  
Second, it will be shown that it can be optimal for the court to raise the standard in 
comparison to first best.  
 
Again, an example will suffice. Consider the following expected losses arising from 
an alternative care level (parameterized again by care costs) as shown in Table 2:  
 
x 
y 
 
2 
 
1 
 
0 
 
3 
 
0 
 
½ 
 
1 
 
1 
 
¼ 
 
5/6 
 
7/4 
 
0 
 
½ 
 
2 
 
10 
 
Table 2  
 
The first best outcome is ),2,0(),( =xy  since no other combination of care levels 
achieves a total cost of less than ½2 . However, it will now be proven that:  
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When U’s ex-ante believes that he will not be comparatively negligent and his beliefs 
concerning the standards for IN satisfy the following condition: 
7/)3()0()3(2 =>=>= yyy ρρρ , then the equilibrium strategies are: 
0)0(;1)1(;0)3( *** === yyy , 1)0(;0)1(;0)3( *** ====== yxyxyx , the outcome is 
1=y  and ,2=x  and the standards 1=y  and 0=x  are optimal.   
 
It will first be proven that the strategies of IN and U are equilibrium strategies given 
that .0=x  Consider first U’s response when IN chooses 0=y :  
Given that IN chooses 0=y  both when the standard is 3=y  and when it is 0=y ,  
Bayesian updating implies that the ex post probability of the standard being 3=y  
when 0=y  equals 
)0()3(
)3(
=+=
=
yy
y
ρρ
ρ , while the probability that it is 0=y  equals 
)0()3(
)0(
=+=
=
yy
y
ρρ
ρ . Given these probabilities, the costs to U of choosing 2 , 1 or 0  
can now be compared, given that U assumes he is never held comparatively 
negligent. The cost to U of choosing 2  equals: 
)0()3(
)3(
=+=
=
yy
y
ρρ
ρ
2 +
)0()3(
)0(
=+=
=
yy
y
ρρ
ρ ½)2( + . The cost of choosing 1 equals: 
)0()3(
)3(
=+=
=
yy
y
ρρ
ρ
1 +
)0()3(
)0(
=+=
=
yy
y
ρρ
ρ )21( + . The cost of choosing 0  equals: 
)0()3(
)3(
=+=
=
yy
y
ρρ
ρ
0 +
)0()3(
)0(
=+=
=
yy
y
ρρ
ρ )100( + . Hence, U prefers 1 over 2  
when: 
)0()3(
)3(
=+=
=
yy
y
ρρ
ρ
2 +
)0()3(
)0(
=+=
=
yy
y
ρρ
ρ ½)2( + > 
)0()3(
)3(
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y
ρρ
ρ
1+
)0()3(
)0(
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ρ )21( + ; i.e.  when ).0()3(2 ρρ >=y   
U prefers 1 to 0  when:  
)0()3(
)3(
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ρ
0 +
)0()3(
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y
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)0()3(
)3(
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y
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ρ
1+
)0()3(
)0(
=+=
=
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y
ρρ
ρ )21( + , i.e. when )3()0(7 =>= yy ρρ .  
Thus, U will respond to 0=y  with 1 when 7/)3()0()3(2 =>=>= yyy ρρρ  when 
he assumes that he will not be held comparatively negligent.  
Next, consider U’s response to 1. If IN chooses 1, U can infer that this must be the 
standard (since, in equilibrium, 1 is only chosen by IN when 1 is the standard), and U 
will hence choose 0 , which minimizes his given his belief about the standard of 
comparative negligence. Finally, if IN chooses 3 , the optimal choice for U is clearly 
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0 , since U will realize that the standard must be 3=y  and that U will hence carry the 
loss; 2  is then the lowest achievable loss.  
Consider, in turn, the strategy by IN given U’s response function. Three possibilities 
should be compared under the assumption that 7/)3()0()3(2 =>=>= yyy ρρρ  
when U responds as just indicated:  
1. The standard is 3=y : It is then better for IN to choose 0  than ,3  since the 
response to 0  will be 1, imposing a total cost of 3  on IN. It is also better for IN to 
choose 0  than  1, since the total cost to 1 is 
4
32 , while the total cost to 0  is 2 .  
2. When the standard is ,1=y  it is better for IN to choose 1 than 0 , since the cost of 
choosing 1 is 1when 1=y  is the standard, while the cost of choosing 0  is 2 , since 
the response to 0  is 1.  
3. When the standard is 0=y , IN will choose 0 , since there is no reason to choose a 
higher level of care than the standard.  
This verifies the stated equilibrium in the game between IN and U.  
It remains to be shown that it is optimal for the court to choose the standards 
)0,1(),( =xy , which lead to the outcome where IN chooses 1 and U chooses 0  with a 
total social cost of 
4
32 . To see this, note that the outcome is the second best outcome. 
Hence, for other standards to be preferable, they must realize the first best outcome. 
However, that the first best cannot be realized can be seen as follows. The first best 
outcome requires that U responds to IN’s act of 0=y by taking the act .2=x  
However, when U responds in this way, it becomes optimal for IN to choose 0=y  
also when the standard is 1=y  or .3=y  Hence, there must then be complete pooling, 
which means that U cannot derive any information from IN’s act. When U ex ante 
believes that ,0=x U will then rather choose 1=x  than ,2=x  when  
)),3()1((2)0(½)2()3(1)1()(1()0()12( =+=+=+<=+=+=+ yyyyyy ρρρρρρ  
i.e. when ))3()1((2)0( =+=<= yyy ρρρ  which is fulfilled when 
)0()3(2 =>= yy ρρ . Hence, the first best cannot be achieved, and the standards 
chosen must then optimal. QED.  
  
Appendix C  
 
Proof that the rule of contributory negligence is weakly dominant when IN is the 
victim and acts first.   
It will be shown that whatever can be implemented by the comparative negligence 
rule can be implemented also by the contributory negligence rule. 
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Consider an equilibrium under the comparative negligence rule in which 'y  is 
implemented and where the standard of comparative negligence is y . It will be 
shown that when 'y  is preferred to some other ''y  under comparative negligence, it 
will also be preferred under contributory negligence when the standard under 
contributory negligence is set equal to 'y . There are four cases to consider:  
A: )( 'yx  and )( ''yx  are both below the standard of due care for U.  
B: )( 'yx  is below the standard of due care while )( ''yx  is not. 
C: )( 'yx  is above or equal to the standard of due care while )( ''yx  is below. 
D: Both are above or equal to the standard of due care for U.   
 
Case A: 'y  cannot be above y , since it will not be worthwhile for IN to take more 
than due care when due care is sufficient to put the whole loss on U. There are two 
sub-cases to consider:  
Case 1: yy ='  
Case 2: yy <'  
In Case 1, there are two further sub-cases: Case 1a: ''' yy <  and Case 1b: ''' yy ≥ .  
Consider first Case 1a: Since 'y  is the preferred choice under comparative 
negligence, and the cost to IN when she takes the level of care 'y  is equal to 'y  as U 
bears the loss when U is negligent and IN is not, it must hold that: 
Lyxypxyyxyfyy ))(,(),),(,(1( ''''''''''' −+< , where f−1  is the share born by IN under the 
comparative negligence rule. Under the contributory negligence rule, when the 
standard of due care is 'y , the cost to IN from taking the level of care 'y  is 'y  given 
that the response from U is the same as under comparative negligence, i.e. the 
negligent )( 'yx , while the cost for IN from taking the level of care ''' yy <  equals 
Lyxypy ))(,( '''''' +  given that IN bears the whole loss when negligent under the 
contributory negligence rule. When Lyxypxyyxyfyy ))(,(),),(,(1( ''''''''''' −+< , it follows 
that Lyxypyy ))(,( ''''''' +< , since 11 ≤− f . Hence, when 'y  is preferred to ''y  under the 
comparative negligence rule, the case is the same under the contributory negligence 
rule.  
Consider then Case 1b: When ''' yy >  and yy ='  under both rules, and U is always 
negligent, the whole loss will be on U under both rules when IN chooses 'y , which 
will hence clearly be preferable to choosing ''' yy >  under both rules.  
In Case 2, where yy <' , there are again two sub-cases: Case 2a: ''' yy <  and Case 2b: 
''' yy ≥ .  
Case 2a: Since 'y  is the preferred choice under comparative negligence, it must hold 
that LyxypxyyxyfyLyxypxyyxyfy ))(,(),),(,(1())(,(),),(,(1( '''''''''''''''' −+<−+ .  
Under the contributory negligence rule with the standard of contributory negligence 
equal to ,'y  the condition becomes Lyxypyy ))(,( '''''''' +<  as IN bears no cost when not 
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negligent, and IN bears the whole cost when negligent at .''y  That 
Lyxypyy ))(,( '''''''' +<  when: 
LyxypxyyxyfyLyxypxyyxyfy ))(,(),),(,(1())(,(),),(,(1( '''''''''''''''' −+<−+  can be seen by 
noting that when: 
LyxypxyyxyfyLyxypxyyxyfy ))(,(),),(,(1())(,(),),(,(1( '''''''''''''''' −+<−+ , then 
Lyxypxyyxyfyy ))(,(),),(,(1( '''''''''''' −+< , and then Lyxypyy ))(,( '''''''' +< , since 11 ≤− f . 
Case 2b: When ''' yy >  and 'y  is the standard of contributory negligence, and U is 
negligent, 'y  must be preferred to ''y  under the contributory negligence rule, since IN 
will bear no part of the loss when she acts with due care (and U does not). This ends 
the proof of Case A.  
Cases B, C and D follow the same logic. The calculations are almost identical to the 
ones just carried out, and are available from the author upon request.  
 
References 
 
Ayres, I. and Gertner, R., 2001. Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, in E. A. Posner: Law and Economics. International Library 
of Essays in Law and Legal Theory. Second Series. Aldershot, U.K.; Burlington, VT 
and Sydney, Ashgate Dartmouth, pp. 5-48. 
 
Cooter, R., 2000. Three Effects of Social Norms on law: Expression, Deterrence, and 
Internalization, vol. 79 Oregon Law Review, pp 1-22. 
Craswell, R., 2006. Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and 
Nondisclosure in Contract Law and Elsewhere, vol. 92 Virginia Law Review, p. 565. 
Craswell, R. and Calfee, C., 1986. Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 
Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, vol. 2, pp. 279-303. 
 
Ellickson, R., 1991. Order without Law: How Neighbours Settle Disputes, 
Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press. 
 
Kaplow, L., 1990. Optimal Deterrence, Uninformed Individuals, and Acquiring 
Information about Whether Acts Are Subject to Sanctions, Journal of Law, 
Economics, & Organization, vol. 6, 1, spring, pp. 93-128. 
 
Kaplow, L. and Shavell, S., 1992. Private Versus Socially Optimal Provision of Ex 
Ante Legal Advice, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 
306-320. 
 
27 
 
 
27 
 
 
Lando, H., 2007. Optimal Negligence Standards When One Party Is Ignorant of the 
Standards, Research in Law and Economics, no. 1, pp 207-216. 
 
Miceli T., 2004. The Economic Approach to Law, Stanford University Press.   
 
Posner, E., 2006. There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law, 33 Fla. St. U. 
L. Rev. 563.  
 
Shavell, S., 1994. Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale, RAND 
Journal of Economics, vol. 25(1), spring, pp. 20-36. 
 
Shavell, S. 1992. Liability and the Incentive to Obtain Information about Risk, The 
Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 259-270.  
 
Shavell, S., 1987. Economic Analysis of Accident Law, Cambridge, MA, Harvard 
University Press. 
  
Verkerke, J.H., 2003. Legal Ignorance and Information-Forcing Rules. University of 
Virginia Law & Economics Research Paper, no. 03-04, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=405560. 
 
Wittman, D., 1981. Optimal Pricing of Sequential Inputs: Last Clear Chance, 
Mitigation of Damages, and Related Doctrines in the Law, The Journal of Legal 
Studies, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 65-91.  
  
 
 
